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THE “SOCIAL MAGIC” OF MERIT:   
DIVERSITY, EQUITY, AND INCLUSION IN 
THE ENGLISH AND WELSH LEGAL PROFESSION 
Hilary Sommerlad* 
 
The discourse of merit is central to the “boundary” practices deployed 
by the white male elite of the English legal profession to exclude outsiders.  
The official discourse of government and regulatory body reports presents 
merit as an objectively verifiable and quantifiable property, synonymous 
with “excellence,” the salience of which in the recruitment process is 
indicative of the modernization of the profession.  In this form it is 
mobilized to deflect criticism of the slow progress toward diversity.  
Critical interrogation of the discourse of merit reveals that it operates 
rather differently as a key structuring principle of the profession.  The 
alternative meaning of merit as “deservingness” provides a teleological 
argument for rewarding the embodied cultural practices of white male 
elites and underscores individual white men’s sense of their property rights 
to high status positions.  Using historical sources and data from a series of 
qualitative studies, this Article will explore how merit in this sense of 
deservingness has been, and continues to be, deployed to resist outsiders’ 
usurpationary projects.  It will further argue that this understanding of 
merit also illuminates how such traditional practices as homosocial 
bonding through, for instance, sporting or drinking activities and all hours 
work establish men’s merit with other men and generally support the 
naturalization of white male authority. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I would like, obviously, the judiciary to be as diverse as we can get it.  
But that must not interfere with the fundamental principle that we have 
got to choose the best man for the job.1 
*     *     * 
It goes without saying—but is often said—that appointments must be 
made on merit.  But it is strange how this word “merit” only pops up 
when there is talk of changing or expanding the pool from which judges 
are appointed.2 
*     *     * 
I strongly support diversity when—and only when—it equals merit.  It 
will be very important that women—particularly those from ethnic 
minorities—who may not be able to bear the strain of the judicial process 
are not placed in a position where they may find themselves failing 
because there has been too much enthusiasm for diversity and not enough 
for merit.  This is very important.  I have a vivid recollection of a woman 
judge many years ago who was a very fine pianist.  She should have 
remained a pianist.3 
*     *     * 
This Article contributes to the debate over diversity, equity, and inclusion 
in the legal profession by interrogating the concept of merit and exploring 
its functional relationship with the English legal profession.4  It argues that 
the “social magic” of merit lies in its capacity to sanctify an exclusionary 
social order by masking its material basis.  Rarely problematized in 
mainstream accounts,5 merit displays an empty, teleological quality that 
 
 1. Kate Malleson, Rethinking the Merit Principle in Judicial Selection, 33 J.L. & SOC’Y 
126, 126 (2006) (quoting Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Evidence to the Constitutional Affairs 
Committee, First Report, Inquiry into the Provisions of the Constitutional Reform Bill, 
2003–04, HC 48-II). 
 2. Lady Brenda Hale, House of Lords, Women in the Law, Address at the British-
German Jurists’ Association Birmingham Conference (Apr. 24, 2004), available at 
http://www.bgja.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Bham-Conf-Lady-Hales-Speakers-
Notes.pdf (emphasis added); see also Brenda Hale, Equality and the Judiciary:  Why Should 
We Want More Women Judges?, 2001 PUB. L. 489, 493. 
 3. 28 May 2012, PARL. DEB., H.L. (2012) 987 (U.K.) (Lady Butler Sloss), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldhansrd/text/120528-0001.htm. 
 4. The various countries that make up the United Kingdom have their own legal 
systems; here, I am discussing the legal profession of England and Wales. 
 5. Talent is another concept commonly deployed in recruitment circles and which, like 
merit, is rarely defined; for instance, it has been called the “sum of a person’s abilities,” 
which, however, “eludes description:  [y]ou simply know it when you see it.” ED MICHAELS 
ET AL., THE WAR FOR TALENT xii (2001).  This study also implied that talent (like merit) is a 
finite resource. Id.  However, there is an extensive academic literature that challenges the 
possibility of an objective interpretation of merit. See generally Margaret Thornton, 
‘Otherness’ on the Bench: How Merit Is Gendered, 29 SYDNEY L. REV. 391 (2007) 
(revealing the misogyny which underpins the selection and appointment of women judges in 
Australia); Savita Kumra, Gendered Constructions of Merit and Impression Management 
Within Professional Service Firms, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GENDER IN 
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allows it to appear as a transcendent, ahistorical component of a moral order 
based on universality, disinterest, and achieved excellence.  Its entwinement 
with law in naturalizing and legitimizing the social order is revealed by the 
grounding of law’s public interest role in the objective verification of the 
profession’s competence, the claims to the neutrality of its labor markets, 
and to a corresponding social detachment.  In practice, as the above 
quotations suggest, conceptualizations of merit and professionalism are 
rooted in the contemporary system of social stratification and the criteria or 
standards which encompass “concrete monuments to socially accepted 
subjective preference.”6  I demonstrate this point by beginning the Article 
with a brief statistical overview of the demographic profile of the main 
branches of the legal profession in England and Wales. 
In Part II, I discuss the formation of the legal profession to expose its  
hidden structures, including mental structures, the effect of which is 
reflected in these statistics.  The legal profession exemplifies par 
excellence, the “relative dehistoricization and eternalization of the structure 
of [the] sexual [and other] division[s],”7 and there is correspondingly an 
acute need to trace the genealogy of professional merit as it came to be 
embodied as male and white.  The significance for law’s legitimacy and its 
world-affirming role of an appearance of antiquity require us to unpack 
those elements of professional culture which present it as without history8 
and to shed light on the emergence of merit as one of its founding “truths.”  
A further reason for reflecting on the historical conditions that shaped the 
modern profession is that social change does not progress in a linear fashion 
but is rather characterized by the persistence of archaic residues, including 
premodern practices and inequalities.  This is particularly true of the 
professional project that, like any historical process, “[bound] together 
elements which, analytically, pertain to different and even antithetic 
structural complexes.”9 
In this part, I draw on historical accounts and documentary sources to 
show how antique cultures of masculine domination and class (noting the 
resilience of aristocratic culture in British society) contoured the complex 
 
ORGANIZATIONS 269 (Savita Kumra, Ruth Simpson & Ronald J. Burke eds., 2014); IRIS 
MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 192–222 (1990) (contesting the 
U.S. claim to be a meritocratic society); Barbara F. Reskin, Including Mechanisms in Our 
Models of Ascriptive Inequality, 68 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (2003). 
 6. PATRICIA A. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 99 (1991). 
 7. PIERRE BOURDIEU, MASCULINE DOMINATION vii–viii (2001) [hereinafter BOURDIEU, 
DOMINATION].  Bourdieu’s conceptualization of a dynamic social order entails revealing the 
contingency of a culture’s products; a consistent theme of his work, therefore, is the need to 
expose the “false eternalization” of social structures by revealing the conditions that 
produced them. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE RULES OF ART:  GENESIS AND STRUCTURE OF THE 
LITERARY FIELD 298 (1996); see also Joan Wallach Scott, History in Crisis:  The Others’ 
Side of the Story, 94 AM. HIST. REV. 680 (1989) (positing the need to question who has the 
power to produce social consensus about truth). 
 8. Michel Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, 
PRACTICE:  SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS BY MICHEL FOUCAULT 139, 139–40 (Donald 
F. Bouchard ed., 1980). 
 9. MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM:  MONOPOLIES OF 
COMPETENCE AND SHELTERED MARKETS 5 (2013). 
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relationship between merit and the profession, and how these cultures and 
modes of thought continue to underpin its current segmentation by social 
category.  I also show how the processes of exclusion and differentiation 
that produced this segmentation played out in complex and intersecting 
ways.  For instance, despite the close relationship of the development of 
modern law with the idea of the nation10 and, correspondingly, with 
imperialism and hence the racial stranger, law’s preeminent role in colonial 
governance11 was predicated on the possibility of the nonwhite male 
professional, albeit in a subaltern position.  By contrast, the contemporary 
status of women (who in England and Wales were until recently 
overwhelmingly white) may be traced to law’s denial, until the 1920s, of 
their legal subjecthood and the consequent impossibility of recognizing 
them as professionals (or indeed persons). 
In Part III, which discusses the more recent history of the profession, I 
draw on data from a range of qualitative studies12 to argue that the 
ostensible democratization of British society, which has taken place since 
the end of the Second World War and in particular from the late 1960s 
onwards, masks the persistence of these structures of colonialism, 
patriarchy, and class domination.  Nevertheless, the differentiation of the 
legal field resulting from social modernization13 has made it more difficult 
 
 10. See PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW 54 (1992). 
 11. Law may be described as “the cutting edge of colonialism.” MARTIN CHANOCK, 
LAW, CUSTOM AND SOCIAL ORDER:  THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE IN MALAWI AND ZAMBIA 4 
(1985). 
 12. The data is drawn from three studies conducted from 2009 through this year.  They 
were all qualitative projects, where the samples were obtained by a mixture of 
advertisement, communication with lawyers’ sectional groups (such as the Association of 
Women Solicitors), use of LinkedIn, and snowball techniques.  Semi-structured interviews 
and focus groups were then conducted.  The latest study began in September 2014 and is 
currently ongoing.  Its aim is to explore with practitioners (barristers, solicitors, and judges, 
including those who no longer practice) their experiences of practice and their understanding 
of merit and professionalism.  To date, ten interviews have been conducted.  The two other 
studies were conducted in 2009 and 2010.  The sample for the 2009 study included 16 
female judges aged between 45 and 62, four of whom were black, Asian, or minority ethnic 
(BAME); in-depth interviews were conducted which aimed to elicit their biographies.  The 
2010 research was commissioned by the Legal Services Board to investigate with female and 
BAME professionals, at a variety of career stages including pre-entry, in a range of 
specialisms and sectors, and in several locations, the reasons for these practitioners’ career 
patterns, and the extent to which they were the product of individual choice or the culture, 
structure, and institutions of the profession.  There were 77 respondents:  13 BAME men, 31 
BAME women, and 33 white women.  For a full description of the studies’ methodologies, 
see Hilary Sommerlad, Let History Judge?  Gender, Race, Class and Performative Identity:  
A Study of Women Judges in England and Wales, in GENDER AND JUDGING 355 (U. Schultz 
& G. Shaw eds., 2013); and HILARY SOMMERLAD ET AL., DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND WALES:  A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF BARRIERS AND INDIVIDUAL 
CHOICES (2010), available at http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_do/Research/ 
Publications/pdf/lsb_diversity_in_the_legal_profession_final_rev.pdf. 
 13. The expansion and diversification of higher education has been at the forefront of 
U.K. government strategies to drive social modernization. See HIGHER EDUC. STATISTICS 
AGENCY, STUDENTS, QUALIFIERS, AND STAFF DATA TABLES, available at 
http://www.hesa.ac.uk/index.php/content/view/1973/239/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) 
(documenting growth in education over the last fifteen years).  This produced a parallel drive 
to optimize the use of human capital. See generally SIR ALAN LANGLANDS, DEP’T FOR EDUC. 
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for existing power holders to demarcate their physical space and retain the 
illusion of objectivity and equity.  Further, merit and individual agency are 
essential components of the neoliberal discourse of the perfect market, and 
modernization of recruitment and promotion practices has produced a 
clearer delineation of the credentials and skills required by the “good 
lawyer.”14  However, the essential plasticity of merit enables it to sustain 
the importance of other (unarticulated) attributes, such as “clubbability,” 
while the centrality of the market encourages notions of personal 
entitlement,15 highlighting merit’s alternative meaning as deservingness.16  
Here we see how homosocial bonding through, for instance, such traditional 
practices as playing sports, drinking, and “all hours” work, has continued to 
establish men’s merit with other men and generally reinforce the 
naturalization of white male authority. 
I.   DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION IN THE CONTEMPORARY PROFESSION 
In 2007, Lord Neuberger said, “The Bar can only flourish and retain 
public confidence if it is . . . diverse and inclusive . . . .  Diversity and 
inclusivity are essential if a modern profession is to maximize its 
credibility.”17  Lord Neuberger’s argument reflects the need for synergy 
between a profession and the macro social and normative context, and the 
reasons for his concern are graphically revealed by the statistics on the three 
main branches of the legal profession in England and Wales.18  In all these 
branches, the past few decades have seen a dramatic increase in the 
numbers of historically excluded groups; however, their terms of inclusion 
have been largely those of subordinates.  The Bar is deeply segmented by 
gender, ethnicity, and socioeconomic background.  For instance, in 2011, 
 
& SKILLS, THE GATEWAYS TO THE PROFESSIONS REPORT (2005), available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/corporate/
migratedd/publications/g/gateways_to_the_professions_report.pdf; PANEL ON FAIR ACCESS 
TO THE PROFESSIONS, UNLEASHING ASPIRATION:  THE FINAL REPORT OF THE PANEL ON FAIR 
ACCESS TO THE PROFESSIONS (2009), available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk 
/+/http:/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/227102/fair-access.pdf. 
 14. Hilary Sommerlad, The Commercialization of Law and the Enterprising Legal 
Practitioner:  Continuity and Change, 18 INT’L J. LEGAL PROFESSION 73, 76 (2011);  see 
Andrew Francis & Hilary Sommerlad, Access to Legal Work Experience and Its Role in the 
(Re)production of Legal Professional Identity, 16 INT’L J. LEGAL PROFESSION 63, 64 (2009). 
 15. Anne Phillips, Egalitarians and the Market:  Dangerous Ideals, 34 SOC. THEORY & 
PRAC. 439, 458–59 (2008). 
 16. Thus in COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2012), merit is described as “From Latin 
meritum ‘a merit, service, kindness, benefit, favor; worth, value, importance,’ neuter of 
meritus, past participle of merere, meriri ‘to earn, deserve, acquire, gain.’” 
 17. Lord Neuberger, Chairman’s Foreward to GEN. COUNCIL OF THE BAR, ENTRY TO THE 
BAR WORKING PARTY 5 (2007), available at www.barcouncil.org.uk/media/ 
164103/finalreportneuberger.pdf. 
 18. The main branches of the profession are (1) solicitors, once the only lawyers with 
direct access to clients and who enjoyed a monopoly over transactions in land; (2) barristers, 
regarded as the “senior” branch of the profession, who specialized in advocacy and once 
alone had rights of audience in the higher courts, and (3) the judiciary.  The highest ranking 
barristers are Queen’s Counsel (QC), which is a status conferred by the Crown on senior, 
leading barristers, known as “taking silk.”  It is now also possible for solicitor advocates to 
be appointed QCs. 
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women made up 35.1 percent of barristers and 18 percent of Queens 
Counsel (QC).19 
The statistics on ethnicity and class are harder to decipher because of the 
complexity and range of interpretations of both concepts.20  The problem is 
exemplified by the term black, Asian, and minority ethnic (BAME), 
commonly used in official statistics and yet encompassing the entire range 
of nonwhite identities.21  Nevertheless, statistical surveys reveal that 9907 
self-employed barristers are white and 1203 are BAME, of whom a mere 68 
were QCs (as opposed to 1273 white barristers).22  Furthermore, both 
women and nonwhite barristers are overrepresented in less prestigious, 
poorly remunerated specialties such as the Criminal Bar.23  The figures on 
socioeconomic background suggest that class is an even more significant 
predictor of professional destiny24—thus 29 percent of pupil barristers in 
2005 and 2006 and 35 percent in 2010 and 2011 were educated at the 
universities of Oxford or Cambridge, whose students are overwhelmingly 
drawn from higher socioeconomic background.25 
 
 19. Joanne Harris, Silk Round 2014:  100 Promoted to QC but Female Representation 
Stalls at 18 Per Cent, LAWYER (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.thelawyer.com/news/practice-
areas/litigation-news/silk-round-2014-100-promoted-to-qc-but-female-representation-stalls-
at-18-per-cent/3016526.article. 
 20. The complexity of these concepts has been compounded by the disintegrating impact 
of macro-level socioeconomic changes leading to claims that contemporary society is post 
social category. See generally ANTHONY GIDDENS, MODERNITY AND SELF-IDENTITY:  SELF 
AND SOCIETY IN THE LATE MODERN AGE (1991).  As Carrier has noted, the consequent 
multiplicity and fluidity of contemporary identity and related complexity of classifications 
makes synoptic analysis of social life very difficult. James G. Carrier, The Trouble with 
Class, 53 EURO. J. SOC. 263, 264 (2012). 
 21. Clearly the deployment of the acronym BAME by both U.K. policymakers and 
academic researchers to denote nonwhite groups is a crude taxonomic device that cannot 
capture the hierarchies of ethnicities and other intersecting forms of identity, and, in fact, is 
fundamental to the ongoing reinscription of “race” as a central feature of professionalism—
but since race is so salient, it is necessary to cite this evidence. 
 22. Bar Barometer: Trends in the Profile of the Bar, GEN. COUNCIL OF THE BAR OF 
ENGLAND AND WALES 27, 44 (June 2014), https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/ 
media/1599997/bsb_barometer_report_112pp_june_13.pdf. 
 23. Equality Analysis (EA)—Litigation, LEGAL SERVS. BD. 1–2, http://www.legal 
servicesboard.org.uk/Projects/statutory_decision_making/pdf/annex_l.pdf (last visited Mar. 
25, 2015). 
 24. Louise Ashley & Laura Empson, Differentiation and Discrimination:  
Understanding Social Class and Social Exclusion in Leading Law Firms, 66 HUM. REL. 219, 
219 (2013). 
 25. In 2007 it was reported that during the previous five years, 100 elite schools—
making up under 3 percent of 3700 schools with sixth forms and sixth form colleges in the 
United Kingdom—accounted for a third of admissions to the universities of Oxford and 
Cambridge (commonly termed “Oxbridge”). Sutton Trust, University Admissions By 
Individual Schools 2007, at 6, available at http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Education 
/documents/2007/09/20/Strust.pdf.  From 2010 to 2011, the situation was no better, with just 
2.5 percent of Oxford students and 3.1 percent of Cambridge students from low-participation 
neighborhoods.  Both universities scored below admission benchmarks calculated by the 
Higher Education Statistics Agency, a nongovernmental body, for students from lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds, admitting around 10 percent from that group. Sonia van Gilder 
Cooke, Britain’s Class Divide:  Can Oxbridge Solve Its Privilege Problem?, TIME (Jan. 8, 
2013), http://world.time.com/2013/01/08/can-oxbridge-solve-its-privilege-problem/. 
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Similar inequalities pattern the solicitors’ profession.  For instance, since 
2002, the number of male solicitors with Practising Certificates (PCs) 
increased by 23.9 percent as compared to a 77.5 percent  increase in the 
numbers of women, and in 2012, 47.4 percent of solicitors with PCs were 
female.26  However, in 2013, women represented only just over 20 percent 
of partners in the profession as a whole,27 and this discrepancy is more 
marked when we correlate the proportions who are equity partners with the 
prestige of the firm.  So, women account for less than 10 percent of equity 
partners in the top one hundred law firms by turnover, and 5 percent in the 
top thirty.28  A survey conducted in 2013 also revealed the persistence of a 
significant gender pay gap:  the average female lawyer is paid £51,396 a 
year less than a male lawyer and receives half the amount in bonuses.29  
Like women, the proportions of solicitors drawn from groups categorized as 
BAME are overrepresented as compared to in the population as a whole:  In 
2011, 12.6 percent of solicitors with PCs were recorded as BAME.30  
However, they were only 5 percent of partners in top firms31 (a mere 0.6 
percent of black solicitors)32 and were more likely to be solo practitioners 
and working in low status, less profitable sectors.33  Turning to the 
significance of class origins for an individual’s career trajectory, recent 
years have seen a reinvigoration of archaic signs of privilege, so that it is 
increasingly difficult for those from “lower” socioeconomic backgrounds 
and/or low status universities to even enter the profession; conversely, the 
value of a degree from Oxford or Cambridge has increased.34 
The confinement of minority groups to subordinate positions in the 
judiciary is even more striking.  Data collected by the Judicial Office shows 
that in 2013–2014, out of a total of 3452 judges, 845 were women (24.5 
 
 26. BILL COLE, LAW SOC’Y, TRENDS IN THE SOLICITORS’ PROFESSION, ANNUAL 
STATISTICAL REPORT 2002, at 9 (2003), available at http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/policy-
campaigns/research-trends/annual-statistical-reports/; LAW SOC’Y, TRENDS IN THE 
SOLICITORS’ PROFESSION, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 2012, at 4 (2013), available at 
http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/policy-campaigns/research-trends/annual-statistical-reports/. 
 27. See LAW SOC’Y, supra note 26, at 26. 
 28. Lucy Burton, Revealed:  Females Make Up Less Than 10 Per Cent of Top 100’s 
Equity Partner Ranks, LAWYER (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.thelawyer.com/revealed-
females-make-up-less-than-10-per-cent-of-top-100s-equity-partner-ranks/1015190.article. 
 29. Equality Law, Women Lawyers’ Pay Lags Behind Male Colleagues’ (Jan. 24, 2013), 
http://www.equality-law.co.uk/news/2998/66/Women-lawyers-pay-lags-behind-male-
colleagues/. 
 30. See LAW SOC’Y, supra note 26, at 5, 13. 
 31. Kathleen Hall, Glass Ceiling Most Apparent in Magic Circle, LAW SOC’Y GAZETTE 
(Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/practice/glass-ceiling-most-apparent-in-magic-
circle/5038631.article; see also Ethnic Minorities Make Up Only 3 Per Cent of UK 100 
Partners, LAWYER, Apr. 3, 2006, at 2, available at http://www.thelawyer.com/ethnic-
minorities-make-up-only-3-per-cent-of-uk-100-partners/119388.article. 
 32. Kathleen Hall, Diversity League Table Shows Promotion Gap, LAW SOC’Y GAZETTE 
(Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/diversity-league-table-shows-promotion-
gap/5038711.article. 
 33. See LAW SOC’Y, supra note 26, at 14, 15, 29. 
 34. See Marc Galanter & Simon Roberts, From Kinship to Magic Circle:  The London 
Commercial Law Firm in the Twentieth Century, 15 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 143, 168 (2008). 
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percent), 2686 white (77.8 percent), and 164 BAME (5.8 percent).35  
Further, once the higher courts are reached, the number of individuals 
drawn from nonnormative groups dwindles dramatically.  The Supreme 
Court judiciary comprises all white males and one white female—Lady 
Brenda Hale—and there are only two BAME judges at the deputy masters, 
deputy registrars, deputy costs judges, and deputy district judges (PRFD) 
level, and none higher up, the lone black female High Court judge having 
left the judiciary a couple of years ago.36  At the same time, the judiciary as 
a whole is a virtually exclusive preserve of the socioeconomic elite:  as of 
2004, 75 percent of the judiciary attended fee-paying schools and 81 
percent the universities of either Oxford or Cambridge.37 
The bias toward middle-class white males suggested by these statistics, 
reinforced by the lack of transparency in appointment processes,38 produced 
mounting public criticism.39  In an attempt to retrieve the image of the 
profession as neutral and hence meritocratic, the judicial recruitment 
processes have been reformed by the Constitutional Reform Act 200540 
(CRA), research studies and enquiries commissioned, and numerous other 
initiatives launched.41  The ongoing marketization of the profession has 
underpinned these moves, the ideological presumption being that the free 
market will erode bias and generate a true meritocracy.  Phillips describes 
this notion as an absurdity, noting that “markets everywhere continue to be 
 
 35. 2014 JUDICIAL DIVERSITY STATISTICS:  GENDER, ENTHNICITY, PROFESSION, AND AGE, 
available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/courts-diversity-stats-
2013-14.xls (last visited Mar. 25, 2015). 
 36. See Dame Linda Dobbs Retires from the High Court Bench, QUEEN MARY, UNIV. OF 
LONDON SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.law.qmul.ac.uk/eji/news/index.html (last visited Mar. 
25, 2015). 
 37. See SUTTON TRUST, THE EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF THE UK’S TOP SOLICITORS, 
BARRISTERS AND JUDGES 7 (2005), available at http://www.suttontrust.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2005/05/Comparison_educational_backgrounds.pdf. 
 38. See LORD ELWYN JONES, IN MY TIME:  AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 265 (1983) (clarifying 
why the process was known as secret soundings “when a . . . vacancy had to be filled, the 
heads of the Division . . . were invited to my office to consider likely names.  Usually we 
agreed as to the one most meriting appointment.  Occasionally two names were equally 
supported.  Then the choice was left to me.”). 
 39. Criticisms of the uniform social composition and political views of the judiciary 
began to be widely voiced in the 1970s and 1980s. See, e.g., J.A.G. GRIFFITHS, THE POLITICS 
OF THE JUDICIARY 18–22 (1977). 
 40. See Constitutional Reform Act 2005, c. 4, § 61 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/4/section/61/data.pdf; see also id. § 64, available 
at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/4/section/64.  The failure of this reform to 
generate progress led to a new provision for a diversity preference where candidates are of 
equal merit in the context of judicial appointments. See Crime and Courts Act 2013, c. 22, 
§ 20, sch. 13, pt. 2 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/22/ 
schedule/13/enacted (empowering the selection commission to make use of the so-called 
“Equal Merit” or “Tipping Point” provision). 
 41. See, e.g., DEP’T OF CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, INCREASING DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION:  A REPORT ON GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS (2005), available at 
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/legalsys/diversity_in_legal_2c
ol.pdf; see also Chairman’s Foreward, supra note 17 (the working party on the Bar chaired 
by Lord Neuberger); SOMMERLAD, supra note 12, at 21–24. 
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characterized by systemic differentiation by gender and race,”42 and the 
evidence supports her argument. 
For instance, since the appointment of Lady Hale to the Supreme Court 
eleven years ago, thirteen new Supreme Court judges have been appointed, 
all of whom, despite the enactment of the CRA in 2005, have been white 
males; furthermore, 2013 saw the appointment of three Supreme Court 
judges, the Lord Chief Justice, and the President of the Queen’s Bench 
Division—all of whom were white males.43 
Nevertheless, mainstream commentators persist with the claim that the 
profession is meritocratic.  As a result, the “trickle up” narrative remains the 
most popular explanation for the profession’s segmentation, exemplified by 
Jonathan Sumption’s evidence to the Justice Committee: 
[T]he diversity of appointments is extremely sensitive to the profile of the 
higher reaches of the legal professions.  My own impression . . . based on 
a fair amount of experience—is that the quality of BME candidates 
entering the legal profession now has continuously increased over a 
number of years, just as the quality and number of women entering the 
legal profession continuously increased over a substantial period a 
generation ago.44 
The failure to mention any structural causes of professional segmentation 
and, instead, the explicit attribution of the absence of marginalized groups45 
to their own “quality” and choices, finds its counterpart in the narrative that 
legal professionals who are in a position to select and promote are incapable 
of bias.  Thus, in his response to questioning by the House of Lords Select 
 
 42. Anne Phillips, Egalitarians and the Market:  Dangerous Ideals, 34 SOC. THEORY & 
PRAC. 439, 447 (2008). 
 43. For rich discussions of merit and judicial selection procedures, see Kate Malleson, 
White, Male, and Middle Class—Is a Diverse Judiciary a Pipe Dream 2 (June 1, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.qmul.ac.uk/eji/docs/78402.pdf; Kate 
Malleson, Gender Quotas for the Judiciary in England and Wales, in GENDER AND JUDGING, 
supra note 12, at 481; Malleson, supra note 1; see also Equal Justices Initiative, QUEEN 
MARY, UNIV. OF LONDON SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.law.qmul.ac.uk/eji/; Hilary 
Sommerlad, Diversity, Merit, and the English Judiciary:  The Lessons that Can Be Learned 
from the Reform of Selection Processes, a U.K. Contribution, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. CITY 
SQUARE 94, 94–107 (2013). 
 44. JUSTICE COMM., THE WORK OF THE JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS COMMISSION:  ORAL 
EVIDENCE, 2010, H.C. 449-I (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/ 
pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmjust/449-i/10090702.htm. 
 45. Iris Marion Young, Equality of Whom?  Social Groups and Judgments of Injustice, 9 
J. POL. PHIL. 1, 8 (2001) (“A large set of the causes of an unequal distribution of [resources] 
or unequal opportunities between individuals, however, is attributable neither to individual 
preferences and choices nor to luck or accident.  Instead, the causes of many inequalities of 
resources or opportunities among individuals lie in social institutions, their rules and 
relations, and the decisions others make within them that affect the lives of the individuals 
compared.”).  A further critique of current thinking argues that it “misrepresents the effects 
of social relations and institutions as if these were generated by individual choice,” and that 
“political philosophers have conjured up a large cast of contrasting individuals around which 
to build their stories of equality, responsibility or choice,” the effect of which is to encourage 
us to think that our chance talents and aspirations really do explain how and where we end 
up drawing us “into a discourse of individual variation that has less and less purchase on the 
larger issues of inequality.” Anne Phillips, Defending Equality of Outcome, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 
1, 15 (2004). 
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Committee inquiry into the reasons for slow progress on judicial diversity, 
then-Lord Chancellor Kenneth Clarke said, “[t]he legal world at the kind of 
level we are talking about is free of people with prejudice.”46  His 
subsequent description of the judicial selection process as carried out “[by] 
competent upper middle class professionals who are utterly beyond all 
that”47 is a powerful proclamation of the essential justice of the status quo.  
It also corresponds to the profession’s self-justification in its formative 
period as uniquely ethical and objective, and in particular its “consecration” 
of its leading figures as honorable “gentlemen.” 
II.   MERIT AND THE FORMATION OF THE MODERN PROFESSION 
The claim to be structured by merit, or objectively verified competence, 
was a major rationale for the professions’ warrant to practice since it 
underpinned the professions’ further claims to be characterized by a 
distinctive ethicality and expert knowledge.48  In turn, these claimed 
characteristics justified the erection and policing of jurisdictional 
boundaries and the control of the production of practitioners and were thus 
fundamental to the professional project of market creation and attainment of 
social status.49  This grounding of the professions’ legitimacy in the 
achievement of socially recognized expertise entailed the development of 
formal training and credentialing.50  In other words, the essence of the 
modern professional project was that its criteria for recognition be based on 
achievement rather than ascription.  Consequently, professions prefigure the 
“general restructuring of social inequality in contemporary capitalist 
societies,”51 that is, a form of inequality in which social status is tied to 
expertise rather than to privileges of social category, and which is, 
therefore, in contrast to the ancient regime of inherited status, essentially 
meritocratic.52 
However, this Enlightenment aspect of the professional project was 
compromised by two further features connected to the ways in which 
professions sought to establish their legitimacy.  First, the emphasis on the 
cognitive and normative dimensions of their contribution to society, and 
hence its transcendent values, required detachment from the class 
 
 46. SELECT COMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION, MEETINGS WITH THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE AND 
THE LORD CHANCELLOR, 2010–2011, H.L. 89, at 56 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/constitution/LordChancellor/ 
FinalLCandLCJEvidence.pdf. 
 47. Id. 
 48. LARSON, supra note 9, at xvii. 
 49. Id.  Trait theorists also emphasized the professions’ independence and formal 
knowledge base and memberships based on achieved rather than ascribed status. See, e.g., 
GEOFFREY MILLERSON, THE QUALIFYING ASSOCIATIONS:  A STUDY IN PROFESSIONALIZATION 
(1964). 
 50. LARSON, supra note 9, at xvii. 
 51. Id. 
 52. For Enlightenment intellectuals, the concept of a meritocracy was therefore viewed 
as a key feature of the new regime that was hoped would replace the ancient regime of 
inherited privilege. 
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structure.53  Clearly, it was especially vital to the function of the legal 
profession that the claim to neutrality and independence be convincing.  
Yet, the credibility of the claim to be people who, to paraphrase the 
comments of Kenneth Clarke,54 were incapable of bias, depended in turn on 
establishing themselves as upper middle class.  This claim therefore meshed 
with professionals’ aspiration to become “gentlemen.”  As a result, 
professions are preeminent “status groups”—that is, communities based on 
ideas of proper lifestyles who “had honor” and were owed deference by 
wider society.55  This goal of embedding themselves within the existing 
class structure as a high status group was both particularly significant and 
relatively easy for lawyers:  their monopoly of property transactions and 
role in the development of the industrial economy as “conceptive 
ideologists” of capital56 led to the imbrication of the worlds of law and 
business.57  The resulting tensions between the modernizing and status 
aspects of the professional project were compounded by the aim of 
naturalizing and indeed sacralizing professionals’ key social role by 
asserting their historical continuity,58 that is with the ancient regime.  
Again, as noted above, for the legal profession it was particularly important 
to present both itself and the law as dating from time immemorial.59  Yet 
this claim contradicted the Enlightenment assault on natural law, and 
modern law’s self-representation as posited by official, human authority. 
The tensions generated by these contradictory facets of the professional 
project—on the one hand, the connection between its legitimacy and 
credentialed knowledge and independence, and, on the other, its drive to 
achieve social status and its social embeddedness—were particularly acute 
in British society where the aristocracy’s lingering political, social, and 
cultural power placed structural and ideological constraints on professional 
reformism.  Larson writes of “a context where aristocratic status models and 
ideologies were available and never entirely defeated by the attacks of the 
 
 53. As Larson writes, “[T]he emphasis on the cognitive and normative dimensions of 
profession tends to separate these special categories of the social division of labor from the 
class structure in which they are also inserted.” LARSON, supra note 9, at xiii.  This self-
presentation, as unattached to social class and hence neutral, became a key part of orthodox 
accounts of the professions. See, e.g., KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 156 (1936). 
 54. See SELECT COMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 46. 
 55. Max Weber’s proposition was that professions only exist because of people’s ideas 
of prestige or dishonor; further, and relatedly, members of such status communities are only 
supposed to associate with people of like status, and all other people are looked at as 
inferiors (or intrinsically un-meritworthy when judged by professional standards). See Max 
Weber, Class, Status, Party, in FROM MAX WEBER:  ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 180 (H. H. Gerth 
& C. Wright Mills eds., 1946). 
 56. Maureen Cain, The General Practice Lawyer and the Client: Towards a Radical 
Conception, 7 INT’L J. SOC. L 331, 352 (1979). 
 57. David Sugarman, Blurred Boundaries:  The Overlapping Worlds of Law, Business, 
and Politics, in LAWYERS IN A POSTMODERN WORLD 105 (Maureen Cain & Christine 
Harrington eds., 1994). 
 58. LARSON, supra note 9, at xv. 
 59. Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law:  Toward a Sociology of the Juridicial Field, 38 
HASTINGS L.J. 805, 820 (Richard Terdiman trans., 1987); see also FITZPATRICK, supra note 
10, at 44–45. 
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rising bourgeoisie against idle property and the system of patronage.”60  
The resulting early aspiration to assimilate into the upper middle classes 
and the persistence of ascription are clearly demonstrated in histories of the 
creation of the professions.  These reveal the work that went into producing 
an institution that had a strong shared identity61 and ensuring that this was 
the right identity.  Thus, Carr-Saunders and Wilson recount the concerns of 
the members of the first professional societies that the individuals lacked 
“social prestige and that their occupations were not fit for gentlemen” and 
the consequent campaign by both solicitors and barristers to construct, 
reconstruct, and affirm their respectability.62  Sugarman describes how the 
Bar did this by distancing itself (geographically, professionally, historically, 
and culturally) from the lower branch,63 whose members tended to be 
extremely poor, by banishing them from the Inns of Court.64  Consequently, 
ideas of social respectability and gentlemanliness were embedded in the 
Bar’s discourse of merit, encapsulated in its rules on entry, dining, dress, 
and its opposition to examinations.  And even when (belatedly) 
examinations were adopted, they were mediated by this essentially 
aristocratic interpretation of “merit” and the desire to filter out those not 
regarded as gentlemen:  “The character of law teaching and thought 
reflected and sustained the intensely hierarchical, Victorian character of 
English society and . . . national identity in the second half of the nineteen 
and the first half of the twentieth centuries.”65 
Sugarman shows too how the Law Society’s professional project 
similarly strove to build respectability so as to assimilate within the upper 
middle classes, and the concerns this generated about being flooded by 
people of lowly standing.66  His account of this construction (and policing) 
of such “folk devils” is illustrated by a quote from the 1880s:  “[There] 
are . . . men who have travelled up the gutter from Fleet Street to the Law 
 
 60. LARSON, supra note 9, at 81.  Parkin subscribes to Larson’s argument that the 
profession’s privileges were achieved and retained through social closure, describing this as 
where professions maintain an artificial skill scarcity and maximize rewards by limiting 
access and opportunities “to a limited circle of eligibles.” FRANK PARKIN, THE SOCIAL 
ANALYSIS OF CLASS STRUCTURE 3 (1974). 
 61. See, e.g., Elizabeth Popp Berman, Before the Professional Project:  Success and 
Failure at Creating an Organisation Representative for English Doctors, 35 THEORY & SOC. 
157, 188 (2006). 
 62. A.M. CARR-SAUNDERS & P.A. WILSON, THE PROFESSIONS 302 (1933). 
 63. Thereby illustrating Weber’s observation of the need to guard their “honor” by only 
associating with people of like status. 
 64. David Sugarman, Who Colonized Whom?:  Historical Reflections on the Intersection 
Between Law, Lawyers, and Accountants in England, in PROFESSIONAL COMPETITION AND 
PROFESSIONAL POWER:  LAWYERS, ACCOUNTANTS AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
MARKETS 226 (Y. Dezalay & D. Sugarman eds., 1995). 
 65. David Sugarman, “Great Beyond His Knowing”:  Morton Horwitz’s Influence on 
Legal Education and Scholarship in England, Canada, and Australia, in TRANSFORMATIONS 
IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY II—ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MORTON J. HORWITZ 508 (Daniel W. 
Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2009). 
 66. The Law Society is the professional body of solicitors. 
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Institution . . . Doubtful h’s and dirty linen pass freely through the 
examination hall of our Society.”67 
Sugarman has speculated whether we can see in this expression of class-
consciousness a racial element, since it was in the 1880s that Jews were 
beginning to emigrate in large numbers from Eastern Europe, generating 
significant concerns within British society and the resurgence of anti-
Semitism.68  If he is correct, this would have merely added a layer of overt 
anti-Semitism to a profession that, like all of British society, had already 
been thoroughly racialized by the colonial project to remake the world in 
European terms.  While the rule of law and merit-based bureaucracy were 
key components of colonialism’s civilizing mission, it reserved for itself 
exceptions “premised on racial and ethnic, religious and linguistic 
differences between the colonizing and subaltern populations.”69  The 
colonial encounter between ethnic groups therefore produced ethnic 
identities and hierarchies,70 symbolized by the racialized stranger who 
exists outside civilization, making ethnicity as central as was class to 
professionalism’s ascriptive inequalities.  As a result, once the meaning of 
professional merit had been standardized in the form of the gentleman, the 
grounds of inclusion/exclusion became relatively uncontroversial:  the 
construction of professional institutions within the parameters of white, 
patriarchal-capitalism in nineteenth-century Britain made it inevitable that 
they largely were limited to privileged white males. 
Nevertheless, there were contradictions embedded in the nineteenth-
century colonial project that parallel those which beset professionalism, 
complicating the professional conceptualization of merit and ethnicity, 
because colonial techniques of governance depended on the recruitment of 
male members of the colonized communities as active agents in the process.  
Thus, Dezelay and Garth show how the role of law in British governance in 
India entailed the progressive opening of the high courts to Indian 
advocates as “both a project of professional promotion and a political 
project for the construction of an aristocracy of compradors.”71  This 
 
 67. See Law Societies:  Incorporated Law Society—Annual Provincial Meeting, 81 LAW 
TIMES 395, 406 (1886). 
 68. David A. Coleman, U.K. Statistics on Immigration:  Development and Limitations, 
21 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 1138, 1142 (1987). 
 69. Terence Halliday & Lucien Karpik, Political Liberalism in the British Post Colony:  
A Theme with Three Variations, in FATES OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM IN THE BRITISH POST-
COLONY: THE POLITICS OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX 4 (T. Halliday, L. Karpik & M. Feeley eds., 
2012). 
 70. FREDRIK BARTH, ETHNIC GROUPS AND BOUNDARIES: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF 
CULTURE DIFFERENCE (1969).  Barth sees ethnic identities as intertwined; he writes in his 
introduction:  “[C]ategorical ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, 
contact and information, but do entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation 
whereby discrete categories are maintained despite changing participation and membership 
in the course of individual life histories.” Id. at 9–10. 
 71. Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, The Legal Construction of a Politics of Notables:  
The Double Game of the Patricians of the Indian Bar in the Market of Civic Virtue, 29 
RETFÆRD. ÅRGANG 42, 48 (2006).  Miriam Ming-Cheng Lo has shown that the Japanese 
empire in Taiwan similarly sustained itself through promoting and institutionalizing an 
indigenous medical profession. MIRIAM MING-CHENG LO, DOCTORS WITHIN BORDERS: 
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dependence of the colonial project on the creation of a cadre of (upper 
class) nonwhite male professionals entailed their inclusion in the 
professional imaginary, and their (provisional) acceptance was facilitated 
by, first, their geographical distance from the “Mother Country” and 
second, the fact that, as high status males, they did not destabilize the key 
social norm of masculine authority. 
However, whereas the construction of “race” as a despised category dates 
from the beginnings of the European colonial project, masculine 
domination is the fundamental classification through which we construct 
the world.72  As a result, men have, for millennia, written women as 
irrational objects, naturalizing their confinement to the private sphere and, 
correspondingly, masculine domination of the public sphere.73  The 
formalization of women’s domestic status in Britain through the law of 
coverture74 made them unimaginable as professionals.75  Women’s 
“natural” functions embedded them in the world of the particular and the 
irrational—only men could act as the neutral vectors of a universal moral 
authority.  As a result, in the profession’s response to the challenges that 
middle-class women began to raise in the late 1870s, merit was not 
mentioned—it was hardly necessary.  Instead, the courts overrode the 
nominal inclusivity of the Interpretation Clause of the Solicitors’ Act 1843 
(which stated that “every Word importing the Masculine Gender only shall 
extend and be applied to a Female as well as a Male”)76 by drawing on the 
Common Law, which had the added virtue of eternalizing and thereby 
naturalizing the bar to women.  Citing the Mirrour of Justices where, along 
with “serfs, deaf mutes . . . [and] criminal persons,” women were ineligible 
for appointment to the Bench, and referring to the “natural” qualities of 
women and contemporary images of women as “frail vessels” and “angels 
 
PROFESSION, ETHNICITY, AND MODERNITY IN COLONIAL TAIWAN 110–11 (2002).  There were 
however limits to the inclusion of the black stranger in a comprador capacity; thus the 
majority black population of Trinidad and Tobago experiences similar patterns of exclusion 
and underrepresentation in professional accountancy as persons of African and African 
Caribbean origin in the United Kingdom. Marcia Annisette, Imperialism and the 
Professions:  The Education and Certification of Accountants in Trinidad and Tobago, 25 
ACCT., ORGS. & SOC’Y 631 (2000). 
 72. BOURDIEU, DOMINATION, supra note 7, at 5. 
 73. Thornton, supra note 5, at 408–09.  Margaret Thornton writes that, stretching back 
to Aristotle, women have been deemed “possessed of an imperfect deliberative faculty.” Id. 
at 409.  The development following the capitalist transformation of production of gendered 
separate spheres has been theorized in terms of a sexual contract, which maintained private 
patriarchy. CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 113 (1988). 
 74. The meaning of coverture is that “[b]y marriage . . . the very being or legal existence 
of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated 
into that of the husband; under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything; 
and is therefore called in our law-french a feme-covert.” 15 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES 304 (Henry Winthrop Ballantine ed., 1915). 
 75. As Witz argues the generic notion of profession must be located “within the 
structural and historical parameters of patriarchal-capitalism.  Professional projects are 
projects of occupational closure . . . [a] variety of strategies . . . characterise these 
projects . . . [which are] gendered.” Anne Witz, Patriarchy and Professions:  The Gendered 
Politics of Occupational Closure, 24 SOC. 675, 675 (1990). 
 76. Solicitors Act, 1843, 6 & 7 Vict. 5, c. 73, § 48 (Eng.). 
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in the house,” the courts showed that it was inconceivable that women 
could be considered “persons.”77  The extent that these views on women’s 
capabilities were entrenched is illustrated by the following comments in the 
debate over the male monopoly of the solicitors’ profession in the latter half 
of the First World War: 
[T]he common sense of mankind has taken a particular view of 
occupations that are fitted for women, and although you may have among 
women particular instances of great learning and great genius even, and in 
some respects the qualities that are appropriate to such a transaction as 
bringing an action, I do not think that the common sense of mankind will 
recognize the sort of thing that solicitors have to do as work which is 
appropriate to women.78 
Nevertheless, the socioeconomic revolution produced by the war made 
continued resistance to women’s inclusion untenable, and in December 
1922, Carrie Morrison became the first woman to be admitted to the Law 
Society.79  This breach in the exclusive masculinity of a key public 
institution symbolized the developing transformation of women’s place in 
the social order. 
However, despite the needs of a modernizing economy for women’s 
labor and the corrosive effect of their participation in the public sphere, the 
animus exhibited by the judgments in the Persons’ Cases persisted.  
Thornton argues that this is glossed over by liberalism “because it 
encapsulates a pre-modern, non-rational element that sits uncomfortably 
with the rational humanism of liberal individualism.”80  Archaic attitudes to 
other subordinated social categories remained similarly resistant to 
modernization, reinforcing the essential masculinity and color of merit. 
 
 77. The following excerpt from a U.S. judgment is exemplary: 
The law of nature destines and qualifies the female sex for the bearing and nurture 
of the children of our race and for the custody of the homes of the world and their 
maintenance in love and honor . . . . Nature has tempered woman as little for the 
[judicial] conflicts of the court room as for the physical conflicts of the battle 
field. . . .  It would be revolting to all female sense of the innocence and sanctity of 
their sex, shocking to man’s reverence for womanhood . . . on which hinge all the 
better affections and humanities of life, that woman should be permitted to mix 
professionally in all the nastiness of the world which finds its way into courts of 
justice . . . . 
In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 232 (1875). 
 78. IVANA BACIK, CATHRYN COSTELLO & EILEEN DREW, GENDER INJUSTICE:  FEMINIZING 
THE LEGAL PROFESSIONS? 119 (2003) (quoting Earl of Halsbury, former Lord Chancellor, 
speaking in the debate in the Lords on the Solicitors (Qualification of Women) Bill, 29 
PARL. DEB., H.L. (1918) 269 (U.K.). 
 79. HILARY SOMMERLAD & PETER SANDERSON, GENDER, CHOICE AND COMMITMENT:  
WOMEN SOLICITORS IN ENGLAND AND WALES AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL STATUS 74 
(1998). 
 80. Thornton, supra note 5, at 408. 
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III.   NEOLIBERALISM, THE LATE MODERN PROFESSION, 
AND THE CENTRALITY OF MERIT 
A complex of socioeconomic and political forces has combined to make 
merit one of the dominant prescriptive norms of late modernity.  These 
forces include the struggle by subordinated groups to develop a more 
inclusionary form of citizenship, one of the symbols of which was the 1944 
Education Act,81 which epitomized a democratization of the idea of merit.82  
The socialized form of citizenship underpinning the welfare state was 
expanded over the course of the three postwar decades, and the Civil Rights 
movements of the 1960s and subsequent identity politics weakened, to a 
degree, its patriarchal, postcolonial, and class-based character.  The 
resulting impetus given to equal opportunity policies was a factor in the 
expansion and diversification of higher education, and beginning in the late 
1970s, this led to an exponential increase first in female, and subsequently, 
BAME students.83 
However, the conceptualization of equality and therefore merit was 
transformed by the advance of neoliberal philosophies,84 which denounced 
policies that sought to address systemic disadvantage as unfair and 
productive of mediocrity.85  Instead, the values of meritocracy were 
articulated as equality of opportunity (rather than outcome) in a market 
unfettered by “arbitrary obstacles”:  “Not birth, nationality, color, religion, 
sex, nor any other irrelevant characteristic should determine the 
opportunities that are open to a person—only his abilities.”86  A primary 
government goal therefore became ensuring that markets could function 
freely and flexibly, because perfect alignment of supply and demand would 
produce optimal outcomes for all:  individuals would make rational choices 
either to invest in their human capital87 or (if they are women) to 
concentrate their main efforts on their domestic role,88 and employers’ 
 
 81. 7 & 8 Geo. 6, c. 31 (Eng.). 
 82. See MICHAEL YOUNG, THE RISE OF THE MERITOCRACY 1870–2033, at 37 (1959). 
 83. However formal education (like merit) facilitates the apparently legitimate 
preservation of social privilege across the generations. See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU & 
JEAN CLAUDE PASSERON, REPRODUCTION IN EDUCATION, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE (2d ed. 
1990).  For an application of this thesis to the U.S. system, see Lucille Jewel, Bourdieu and 
American Legal Education: How Law Schools Reproduce Social Stratification and Class 
Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155, 1173–74 (2008). 
 84. Neoliberalism is a portmanteau term for economic and political philosophy that 
conceptualizes the market as the natural, universal, core organizational form, and therefore 
seeks to restrict the role of government to stimulate and support the free market. 
 85. For instance:  “Egalitarianism forces persons who exceed the average . . . to 
surrender, insofar as possible, the amount by which they exceed that average to persons 
below it.” Jan Narveson, Egalitarianism:  Partial, Counterproductive and Baseless, in 
IDEALS OF EQUALITY 79, 87 (A. Mason ed., 1998). 
 86. MILTON & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE:  A PERSONAL STATEMENT 132 (1980). 
 87. See GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL:  A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION (1964) (analyzing the effect of investment in 
human capital, particularly education, and its economic effects). 
 88. See generally CATHERINE HAKIM, KEY ISSUES IN WOMEN’S WORK:  FEMALE 
DIVERSITY AND THE POLARISATION OF WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT (2d ed. 2004) (describing and 
applying preference theory to explain women’s choices regarding the home and careers). 
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decisions similarly would be informed by rationality, that is, uninfluenced 
by cognitive stereotypes.  This in turn would benefit not only the employer 
but also both the individual—because it would “responsibilize” him, 
driving him to incremental self-improvement and further career 
progression89—and society because having the “best” people in the job 
would enhance international competitiveness. 
The related neoliberal assault on the monopolies of traditional 
professionalism, which has eroded the collegial structure of the solicitors’ 
profession and has replaced the kin-like relationships of traditional law 
partnerships90 with hierarchical capitalist ones, together with the expansion 
of higher education appeared to enhance the possibility of creating this 
perfect labor market.  But in practice, the conversion of what was once a 
scarce resource into abundance, the neoliberal marketization of universities, 
and the de-skilling of professional work as a result of technological 
developments and the demands of global capitalism have combined to 
transform both professional labor markets and the value of credentials. 
Consequently, education, superimposed on the preexisting sources of 
disadvantage of gender and ethnicity, now functions as the primary 
mechanism in the reproduction of inequality, “a huge classificatory machine 
which inscribes changes within the purview of the (existing) structure.”91  
The related transformation in the meaning of a university degree from a 
public good into a private, individualized benefit of varying value92 is 
illustrated by Galanter and Roberts’s comments on the continuing 
significance for corporate firms and their clients of “the class cachet 
conferred by Oxbridge and elite public schools.”93  Nevertheless, since 
credentials ostensibly represent a legitimate source of distinction they ratify 
exclusions and inclusions from the benefits of the social order,94 including 
the stratification of professionals.  This development highlights some of the 
complexities underlying the apparent progressivism of the discourse of 
merit.  In the rest of this part, I will rely on data drawn from a succession of 
qualitative research studies to comment on these features of the late modern 
profession. 
Turning first to the changing nature of professional work, for tribunal and 
lower court judges, this is increasingly routinized and regulated, and for the 
majority of practitioners in solicitors’ firms, it is frequently de-skilled, 
labor-intensive, and undertaken in large, heteronomous organizations.95  
 
 89. See John Brennan & Rajani Naidoo, Higher Education and the Achievement (and/or 
Prevention) of Equity and Social Justice, 56 HIGHER EDUC. 287, 290 (2008).  This thereby 
also places the responsibility for failure onto the individual. See also Marieke van den Brink 
& Yvonne Benschop, Gender Practices in the Construction of Academic Excellence:  Sheep 
with Five Legs, 19 ORG. 507 (2012). 
 90. Michael Burrage, From a Gentlemen’s to a Public Profession: Status and Politics in 
the History of English Solicitors, 3 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 45, 53–55 (1996). 
 91. BOURDIEU & PASSERON, supra note 83, at x. 
 92. M. THORNTON, PRIVATISING THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY:  THE CASE OF LAW 1 (2012). 
 93. Galanter & Roberts, supra note 34, at 168. 
 94. BOURDIEU & PASSERON, supra note 83, at x. 
 95. See Rosemary Hunter, Judicial Diversity and the ‘New’ Judge, in THE FUTURES OF 
LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION (Hilary Sommerlad et al. eds., 2014). 
2342 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
And while the ideology of professionalism sustains the profession’s appeal, 
in practice, the enhanced status of elite universities consequent on their 
marketization means that the profession’s salaried technicians are 
overwhelmingly drawn from graduates of lower status universities and 
other nonnormative groups.  However, the projection of responsibility for 
their position onto the marginalized themselves is exemplified by the 
argument that women’s reluctance to engage in self-promotion is a major 
reason for their failure to advance.  The following quotations from a 2010 
study are illustrative:  “[They] are looking for the people who are 
performing and the people who are peacocks and the female psyche is such 
that we’re uncomfortable in presenting what’s positive about us . . .”;96 
“[T]hey’re (women) always putting themselves down.  They’re always 
saying they’re not as good as they think they are, and it’s not natural for 
women to expound about how good she is at something.  It doesn’t go with 
the territory.”97 
These views coincided with the account given in 2014 by a former 
salaried partner (a white woman), now working as an executive coach:  
“[I]t’s common for women to be reluctant to put themselves forward.  I hear 
that from women the whole time—saying things like, ‘I’ll be found out if I 
apply,’ i.e., imposter syndrome.  A man wouldn’t think of that.”98 
However, this reluctance on the part of women may be linked to the 
knowledge that white men’s sense of entitlement to high level positions 
means that the outsider’s success may be attributed to “reverse 
discrimination.”  For instance, in a study of women judges, a British Asian 
woman described the resentment she experienced from white male 
barristers: 
I think they see you there and think “I could have done that job and she’s 
got it and she’s half my age, so she’s probably a judge just because she’s 
female and black.”  That’s sometimes a feeling I have, but on the other 
hand I know that some do think that because when I was appointed, 
comments like “she’s black and female so she’s ticked more of the Lord 
Chancellor’s boxes” were made to a female colleague who passed them 
on to me.99 
As her subsequent comments reveal, this reaction can reinforce the 
significance of merit for those who are generally the victims of the way it is 
currently conceptualized: 
I found (these comments) very insulting—both to me and to the Lord 
Chancellor—i.e., the implication that he would appoint someone just 
because they are black and/or female.  I also think those kinds of 
comments can be off-putting—they certainly put off the person to whom 
they were made from applying to be a judge.  She said she’d be 
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embarrassed if she was appointed to think that those sorts of things were 
being said and/or thought.100 
These reflections and the following description by the same female judge 
point up the alternative conceptualization of merit not as excellence, but 
rather as “deservingness”: 
A year or two ago this kind of undercurrent was really quite bad . . . [and] 
you do still hear this sort of talk; over lunch for instance you might hear 
one of the judges say things like, “I hear Mr. Bloggs applied but didn’t get 
it—and he’s a silk with so much experience and a jolly good chap, but 
Miss Bahra has applied and now she’s a judge.”  I think that the reality 
was that in the past, a lot of mediocre, average white men were appointed; 
also, whilst the Lord Chancellor did want more blacks and women to 
apply, I don’t think he ever appointed people other than on merit.101 
Further, depictions of women’s humility are worryingly reminiscent of 
those offered by the courts in the Persons’ Cases.  The corollary of such 
essentialist views is that self-promotion may not work to display a woman’s 
merit since it will instead be viewed as an unacceptable breach of the 
gendered script,102 as a British Asian Muslim head of a tribunal found in the 
course of her application to become a Crown Court Judge: 
[The feedback form said] “the panel felt you could have been a little less 
forceful at interview, in order better to display the restrained nature 
expected of a judge in the Crown Court. . . .” I have no idea what “a little 
less forceful” is supposed to mean!  I want to ask them what evidence 
they have to suggest that I am not restrained.  I told them I had to raise my 
voice in court on one occasion to stop a man from physically attacking me 
and members of my panel and that by so doing I had stopped him in his 
tracks long enough for him to be removed by security.  This was in 
response to them asking me if my authority had ever been challenged in 
court. . . .  Would a male candidate have received the same response I 
wonder?103 
This experience of the resilience of gender stereotypes pervaded the 
accounts of other respondents and highlighted the significance of 
exclusionary homosocial practices and the mortification of the newcomer, 
who does not know the rules of the game, holds insufficient cards to play it, 
or is incapable of performing in it.104  For instance, the executive coach 
cited above (interviewed 2014) gave the following account of the operation 
of the merit principle: 
[T]he promotion processes are still very opaque—yes there’s now a form 
to fill in with your business case, but the men then tell the young men all 
 
 100. Anonymous interview (2009). 
 101. Id. 
 102. See Jo Silvester, Questioning Discrimination in the Selection Interview:  A Case for 
More Field Research, 6 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 574, 577 (1996) (noting the tendency for 
employers to read behavior through the lens of social stereotypes). 
 103. Sommerlad, supra note 12, at 371. 
 104. On the performance of professional identity, see ERVING GOFFMAN, THE 
PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959). 
2344 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
the soft stuff, e.g., speak to so-and-so and he’ll look at your figures/advise 
you on this, et cetera—and these are people who’ve already had their way 
eased by being included in the big deals.  It’s a club.  It’s these off-line 
conversations which mean that the men have all this collateral 
information about what to do/how to present themselves, what to 
emphasize and so on—and that in turn bolsters their confidence.105 
She then elaborated on her own experience of the male club and its informal 
sponsorship: 
When I was in the final stages of the application for partner process, we 
all had a dinner together and one of the partners stood up and told a dirty 
joke and then said, “now each of you has to tell a joke;” all the men knew 
about this, and us women (me and another) didn’t—so all the advice I’d 
received went out the window—quite apart from the whole macho 
atmosphere.106 
These descriptions of the clubbable nature of the profession evoke its 
origins and the significance of patron—client relationships both within 
firms and barristers’ inns and across the profession.  Bagehot’s phrase “club 
government” encapsulates this characteristic and is particularly relevant to 
the higher levels of the judiciary.107  Thus, the Association of Women 
Barristers described patronage as key to appointment to the senior 
judiciary.108  Its significance and the sexualized nature of relationships 
between male and female lawyers are also the subject of the following 
comment, redolent of “droit de seigneur,” made in 2010: 
[T]here was a lot of sexism, very casual sexism, at the bar. . . . When you 
went on things like advocacy weekends[], the older barristers would hit 
on you.  And that was perfectly acceptable.  And I think they, kind of, 
assumed that you would go along with that because you needed their 
patronage in order to get on.  And you found that . . . (you) were expected 
to be nice . . . to some of the male barristers in order to be accepted.109 
The evidence from other respondents confirms that while the profession’s 
marketization is antithetical to, and should therefore be eroding, these 
premodern practices, in reality, as the discussion of the enhanced 
importance of high status educational markers indicated, it has had the 
opposite effect.  The comments of a former practitioner in a general High 
Street solicitors’ firm are illustrative; she explained that because the bulk of 
their work was obtained through referrals from other lawyers:  “there was a 
lot of stress on schmoozing events,” and went on to recount the impact this  
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had on the attributes which were valued: 
I remember going out with a marketing boss (a partner) and a private 
client partner from the other firm, and he employed an Asian woman 
paralegal.  He didn’t bring her along . . . [and] openly said that he wanted 
to recruit a man instead of her (the paralegal) because he needed someone 
from a public school.110  I questioned him about this, and he said, “it’s 
because I want the person to be able to communicate with my 
clients.”  . . .  At the Bar in particular, it’s all about how you speak and 
your background.111 
This last comment—which evokes Sugarman’s descriptions of the way in 
which the Bar formed itself into a gentlemanly preserve—is reiterated in a 
description by a British African Caribbean woman judge, given in 2009, of 
her sense of being an outsider, during her training: 
I couldn’t join in any of the informal chat the barristers engaged in, in the 
robing room, over coffee breaks, and so on.  Everyone seemed to have a 
legal background and they’d all done lots of travelling, went skiing, 
played rugby, cricket and so on . . . it was very “clubby” and it was about 
feeling not as knowledgeable, not as cultured . . . a class thing.  At one 
stage I felt so bad about it that I thought about reading the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica—I never did.  But I did buy a whole load of books about 
cricket.112 
In 2014, another young African Caribbean female pupil barrister recounted 
a similar experience of class humiliation: 
I don’t come from a very posh background and was continually scared, 
not of the work, but [of] not knowing what to do socially—for instance, 
the other day I had to meet with a client and senior barrister, and he told 
me to make some coffee, and it was a cafetiere and I didn’t know how to 
do it—I was so humiliated.113 
A further consequence of the prominence of the market to constructions of 
merit is the increased significance of the body “as bearer of symbolic 
value.”114  The comments by a solicitor in 2014 illustrates this 
commodification of women’s bodies:  “[M]y boss talked about one woman 
and marketing, saying she’d be great because she’s got the looks.”115 
And in an echo of the discovery by a solicitor in 2011 that her “nickname 
was ‘big ones,’” she recounted, “I used to sit in the office with the principal 
partner, who I really liked, by the way, but he just used to look at my 
breasts constantly.”116  Another solicitor stated, “[S]ome of the clients were 
racist—but to me it was the subtle but pervasive, everyday sexism that was 
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a problem . . . it went on all the time—things like the male partners having a 
conversation about who had the best breasts.”117 
The impact of these premodern attitudes and practices grounded in 
personal relations on the profession’s claimed basis in objective 
credentialism are summarized in the following comment by a female Asian 
solicitor speaking in 2014: 
It’s . . . difficult to establish your “merit” if you don’t drink and don’t 
have the same background so that it’s difficult for you to do the small 
talk—plus you may not have the right accent—the way you speak and 
your capacity to talk about the sorts of things that are expected is so 
important.  So—you need to get these referrals from these other solicitors, 
and to do that, you have to click, and to do that, you need to be like 
them—they don’t know whether you’re a good solicitor or not—it’s about 
whether you’re like them and whether they like you.118 
CONCLUSION 
As an idea, merit was a central building block in the formation of the 
modern legal profession.  The increased democratization of British society 
in the aftermath of the Second World War shifted its meaning to emphasize 
equality of outcome and began to open up the legal profession to diverse 
groups.  However, the hegemony of free markets as the organizing principle 
of late modern society has led to merit’s fetishization, because it is critical 
to the ideological presumption that markets are “level playing fields.”  As a 
result, merit is constructed as outside history, dissociated from structures of 
power, status, and influence, and its centrality in recruitment and promotion 
processes is read as an index of modernity, deflecting criticism of the slow 
progress toward diversity, equity, and inclusion.  But, as Aristotle observed, 
although “everyone agrees that justice in distributions ought to be according 
to merit in some sense, they do not call merit the same thing.”119  In his 
echo of this view, Sen stresses the materiality of merit: 
[T]he idea of meritocracy may have many virtues, but clarity is not one of 
them. . . .  There is some elementary tension between (1) the inclination to 
see merit in fixed and absolute terms, and (2) the ultimately instrumental 
character of merit—its dependence on the concept of “the good” in the 
relevant society.120 
Young also describes meritocracy as a myth which legitimizes societies that 
in practice remain based on ascriptive inequalities,121 while Bourdieu 
expresses it thus:  “The particularity of the dominant is that they are in a 
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position to ensure that their particular way of being is recognized as 
universal.”122 
This Article has sought to reveal the fluid, contingent, and instrumental 
character of merit, which these comments evoke.  Like all spheres of social 
life, market behavior is in practice governed by a range of conventions and 
codes.123  These conventions are informed by legal and nonlegal norms, 
including particular understandings of desert/merit.124  In the legal 
profession these norms reflect dominant social relations and are thus shaped 
by category-based power hierarchies that have their roots in its history.125  
As a result, professional excellence is “charged with masculine 
implications,”126 and merit is a key component of the informal practices of 
“racial rule.”127  This inscription of merit with subjective, hierarchically 
based social bias therefore works to reproduce the hegemony of white, 
upper middle-class males, while the commonsense understanding of it as 
objective enables it to perform the social magic of legitimizing these results 
of systemic privilege as justly deserved. 
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